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SPENGLER AND THE NEW PESSIMISM
BY VICTOR S. YARROS
PESSIMISTS we have always had with us. It has been affirmed,
indeed, that no intelhgent and well-informed man can avoid
a pessimistic philosophy or attitude. His pessimism, it is true,
need not affect his politics, his social relations, his personal ethics.
The cultivated pessimist is generally a Stoic and a Meliorist. He
believes in the expediency of virtue, in the beauty of goodness and
simplicity. He finds satisfaction in what is called altruism, since
experience teaches him that the highest human pleasure is derived
from ministering to the worthy pleasure of others— including
strangers whose plight arouses his pity and sympathy.
But we are concerned here with the scientific and philosophical
grounds or warrants for pessimism. In particular, we are concerned
with what may be called Spenglerism, after the German scholar and
prophet who in some remarkable works has confidently predicted
the decline and fall of western civilization—and, by implication, of
such Oriental civilizations as imitate and adopt the ways and in-
stitutions of the West—and the reversion of advanced societies to
barbarism and some form of autocracy.
Spengler's fatalism and pessimism have been attributed to the
post-war difficulties and soul-trying crises of the German republic.
It has been pointed out that nowhere outside of Germany has Speng-
ler found disciples and adherents. His is said to be the voice of a
weary and disheartened people. But Spengler's views are not an
aftermath of the war. It seems certain that had that catastrophic
struggle never taken place, or had it ended in a victory for the cen-
tral powers, Spengler would still have arrived at the depressing
conclusions that are his. His philosophy, his social metaphysics, his
reading of human history do not impress the unprejudiced reader
as having been made to order.
But, be this as it may, his assertions and generalizations have
to be considered without speculative references to their origin or
genesis. The questions he raises are profound and far reaching,
and the duty of critical thinkers is to determine how far he suc-
ceeds in proving his affirmations or in establishing, at least, pre-
sumptions in their favor.
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\\'e should be g^rateful to Spengler for the condensed summary
of his formidable and erudite work, Tlic Decline of tlie West. True,
it will not satisfy the serious student, who demands evidence and
demonstration, but Spengler does not despise the average reader
of intelligence and cultivation, and seeks to reach and impress him.
We have, therefore, the right to ask whether the recent small vol-
ume, entitled, Man and Technics: A Contribution to a PJiilosopJiy
of Life, is impressi^e, persuasive, and at all sound.
Let me recall Spengler's basic contention. Our civilization, ac-
cording to him, is sick unto death, and there is no possibility of
curing it. The liberals, radicals, humanists, moralists, and reformers
who endeavor to improve it by tinkering, or by revolutions, are all
equally mistaken. The malady is insidious and fatal, although we
can make the patient a little more comfortable, perhaps, for an
hour or two by treating symptoms and dulling his sensations.
Xow, what ails our civilization? Injustice, sin, lapses from
avowed and attainable standards, conflict between theory and prac-
tice? Is there any hope for progress toward solidarity, fraternity,
liberty, equity, and are we suffering from a sense of imperfection,
unworthiness, treason to our own ideals? Xo, says Spengler.
All this is puerile and illusory. ]Man has no sense of sin, despite
the theologians, the most modern psychologists and the convictions
of the average person. What we call remorse, uneasy conscience,
regret, and shame, can he explained by false teaching. The natural
man does not know or feel these things.
What is the natural man? Spengler answers, a beast of prey
—
solitary, crafty and cruel, "a foe to everyone, killing, hating, re-
solved to conquer or die." Man alone has evolved the Hand, the
greatest of tools, and with this tool he has been able to create,
perfect, and multi])U- machines and techniques. These remarkable
in\entions have served man well, but that stage of his history is
drawing to a close. The machine is now turning against its cre-
ator. The machine is destroying "Faustian civilization," a civili-
zation fatally divided against itself. The masses, inferior, full of
envy and malice, suspicious and unwilling to be led. have learned
from the few superior persons the arts of destruction. The mas-
terful leaders, deprived of followers, are renouncing the machine.
The purpose of tcchni(|ue was domination, but this has become im-
possible. The machine will disappear in the ruins of modern civili-
zation.
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Now, it would be easy to ofifer overwhelming evidence of the
cruelty and savagery of man as he is after several thousand years
of discipline and schooling. Certainly one cannot be very proud of
man. His wars ; his racial, religious, and class conflicts ; his short-
sightedness and levity ; his superstitions and follies ; his animal ap-
petites and his criminal tendencies—all these lines of evidence make,
in the thoughtful, for humility. But the indictment, terrible as it is,
tells only one side of the story. It is true, but it is not the whole
truth.
Man is cruel and selfish ; but do these traits account for the
family, the tribe, the state, the nation, the international organiza-
tions man has called into being? Man is selfish, yet his benevolence
is a reality to be seen on every side. Man is solitary, in a sense,
but he is also gregarious and social. He seeks the companionship
of his fellows in a hundred ways, through clubs, lodges, churches,
political parties, groups, unions, what not. Man fights, but he also
cooperates. He kills, but he also saves. He has passions, but among
them is the passion for truth, the passion for righteousness. He is
vain and egotistical, but he goes to the stake for his ideas, and these
ideas are often abstract and general. Can Spenglerism account for
these amazing contrasts? No, it cannot. But it can belittle and
disparage the better and softer side of human nature. Nietzsche
did this with considerable temporary success. We have not forgot-
ten his "blond beast," his contempt for the masses, his worship
of force in the service of the aristocracy, his scorn for slave-moral-
ity and slave-religion. But Nietzsche was a poet, not a man of
science, and the philosophical student of history cannot take his
paradoxes very seriously.
Progress is a fact that cannot be denied or minimized. Inade-
quate as our civilization is, it is infinitely superior to any known
past civilization. Compare the position of women, the treatment of
children, the care of the insane, the administration of prisons, the
character of punishment, the conditions of the landless workers,
and a hundred other things, in our time and under our legal and
ethical codes, with the corresponding positions and situations in any
definite past era. Who, in the face of the improvements, can
question the reality of progress—material, intellectual, and moral?
Furthermore, what are the most conspicuous and striking ten-
dencies and trends of our present stage of civilization? In inter-
national relations we witness and take part in peace movements,
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world parliaments, world tribunals, world campaigns against white
slavery, the habit-forming drugs, peonage, dreaded diseases, and
the like. The world is still an armed camp, but there are armament
reduction and limitation treaties, war-renunciation pacts, arbitra-
tion and conciliation agencies, and these often succeed, directly or
indirectly, in preyenting or localizing brutal conflicts. True, govern-
ments not infrec|uently break their pledges and inflame the pas-
sions of their ignorant and deceived populations, but even such
cynical or audacious and irresponsible governments often feel that
they have to reckon with public opinion, and have to resort to
sophistry and falsehood to justify their criminal conduct.
Our economic and political systems are very defective and
unsatisfactory, but, after all, these systems are new, historically
speaking, and subject to change. Indeed, they are undergoing radi-
cal changes and graduallx' correcting their faults. Capitalism has
been challenged: old doctrinaire notions, like laissez-faire and rugged
individualism, are being revised; laws are being adjusted to actual
social conditions.
It is not easy to reconcile the "beast-of-prey" idea of man with
the many reform movements of our time—with old-age pensions,
em])lovment insurance, protection of women and children, cooper-
ative organizations, control of monopoly, regulation of public utili-
ties, conservation movements, high and progressive taxation as a
means of redistribrtion of wealth, labor, and radical reform move-
ments. Spenglcr makes no attempt at such reconciliation.
He is sure, however, that the tensions and contradictions created
bv the machine and the machine civilization must, in the end. de-
stroy the latter, and that humanity cannot escape its predestined
doom. History, he asserts, is a succession of human tragedies,
and the i^rosjiect of another and hnal tragedy need not startle us.
I'.ut are these statenienls necessarily true?
'i'ake the second first. Is history a record of failures and de-
feats, frustrations and re\erscs? What about science, the tine arts,
|)hilosophy? Are these human achievements in the realms of the
.s])irit of little moment? \\'hat sort of tragedy is that which does
not affect our best \alues, moral and esthetic?
Was the Renaissance a tragedy? Was the Reformation, or the
discovery of America, or the French Revolution?' There are tragic
chapters in history, bul {\\vw arr also siiK'ndid and bright chapters.
What reasons are tlierr for (kspairiug nt' the future for assuming
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that Nature will defeat Culture? Is not culture a part of nature?
Let us glance at the tensions Spengler views with so much pes-
simism. There is, he says, tension between the leaders and the
mass ; tension between industrial processes and their results ; ten-
sion between advanced nations and backward ones ; tension between
life and organization.
True, these tensions cause much strife and unrest, but it is
wholly arbitrary to conclude that the problems creating the tensions
are hopeless and insoluble. Masses do follow leaders, and leaders
do serve and interpret popular aspirations and interests. Indus-
trial processes are often contradicted by their results—witness tech-
nological unemployment—but the science of social engineering is
seeking to remove those contradictions, and self-interest tends to
reenforce the efforts of the engineers and technicians. Backward
nations are catching up and profiting by the example of the ad-
vanced ones—witness Japan and Russia, which are Americanizing
themselves and competing quite successfully with the advanced
nations.
As to the tension between Life and Organization, Spengler is not
the first keen thinker to call attention to a real and serious contra-
diction that requires study and reconciliation. Life is undoubtedly
restricted, jeopardized and even imperilled by too much organiza-
tion. The rigidity and spiritual poverty of institutionalism needs
no emphasis in our day. But why should it be assumed that or-
ganization is necessarily fatal to spontaneity and elasticity, or to
life? The problem is here, but why give it up as insoluble? Over-
organization is bad, but so is underorganization, which is chaos and
waste of human resources and values. A compromise should not be
ruled out arbitrarily. There is such a thing as freedom under dis-
cipline. The arts, and especially music in its highest forms, illus-
trate that combination. The great composer—a Bach, a Beethoven
—observes rules, yet is true to himself and able to express his deep-
est and subtlest thoughts. And, in the field of practical affairs,
we have all types of associations and clubs in which the members
feel quite free, despite the recognized necessity of constitutions and
by-laws for the regulation of conduct within narrow specified limits.
We cannot but conclude that Spengler unconsciously exagger-
ates in one part of his argument while underestimating the powers
and potentialities of the human mind in other parts.
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I luman achievements in science, art, and technologn.- are so
remarkable and so amazinsj that, to sav the least, a presumption
may be claimed in favor of the Meliorist, who believes that when
we give as much anxious and systematic thought to social prob-
lems as we have given and continue to give to mathematical, physi-
cal, astronomical, and metaphysical problems, the tensions discussed
by Spengler and others will be relieved, the present disorders and
ills of thiC body politic and social will be cured, and the present ob-
stacles to harmonious progress removed.
Civilization is sick, but not unto death. There are grounds for
pessimism, no doubt, but the maladjustments of the world, its
political and economic crises, do not furnish such grounds. Human-
ity has survived other periods of stress and storm. ^Mr. John ^Nlay-
nard Keynes has reminded us that one of these dark and critical
periods lasted six hundred years ! But after each such period, long
or short, the advance was resumed and new conquests made by the
human spirit. History, therefore, warrants hope, not despair.
The new pessimism is as unphilosophical as was the shallow op-
timism of the latter part of the eighteenth century and the mid-
dle of the nineteenth. The truly scientific point of view has no
sympathy with either. It has not lost faith in reason or in human-
ity. Tt believes, and has plenty of evidence to support the belief,
that further progress is possible and reasonably certain, and that
life is worth living even today, to say nothing of the more abun-
dant and nobler life that can be ours if we but will it and work
for it under the guidance of disinterested thinkers and inspiring
leaders.
It is gratifying to note that this is the point of view adopted by
the so-called Hoover Commission on Social Trends in its several
reports as well as in its admirable summary. Ours is a period of
transition, of confusion, but also of changes unmistakably progres-
sive and socially beneficial. The committee emphasizes the duty of
deliberate, rational jilanning in economics and in politics, and of
substituting cooperation for competition, method for blind guessing,
a social ideal for a crude, destructive egoism. In this direction, in
truth, lies moral and sound progress. Spengler's comments on the
conclusions of the Social Trends Commission would be most in-
structive.
